We study the approximation of a description logic (DL) ontology in a less expressive DL, focussing on the case of Horn DLs. It is common to construct such approximations in an ad hoc way in practice and the resulting incompleteness is typically neither analyzed nor understood. In this paper, we show how to construct complete approximations. These are typically infinite or of excessive size and thus cannot be used directly in applications, but our results provide an important theoretical foundation that enables informed decisions when constructing incomplete approximations in practice.
Introduction
There is a large number of description logics (DLs) that vary considerably regarding their expressive power and computational properties [Baader et al., 2017] and despite prominent standardization efforts, many different DLs continue to be used. 1 As a result, it can be necessary to convert an ontology formulated in a DL L S , the source DL, into a different DL L T , the target DL. For example, this happens in ontology import when an engineer who designs an ontology formulated in L T wants to reuse content from an existing ontology formulated in L S . A particularly important case is that L T is a fragment of L S , in which case the described problem is ontology approximation, a form of knowledge compilation [Selman and Kautz, 1996; Darwiche and Marquis, 2002] .
In this paper, we are interested in approximating an ontology O S formulated in a DL L S by an ontology O T formulated in a fragment L T of L S , aiming to preserve all information from O S that is expressible in L T ; this is called a greatest lower bound in knowledge compilation [Selman and Kautz, 1996] . Formally, for every L T concept inclusion C D that is formulated in the signature Σ of O S , we require that O S |= C D if and only if O T |= C D, and likewise for role inclusions and any other type of ontology statement supported by L T . We say that O T is sound as an approximation if it satisfies the "if" part of this property and complete if it satisfies the "only if" part. We consider the case that O T must be formulated in Σ (non-projective approximation) and the case that additional symbols are admitted (projective approximation).
In practice, approximations are often constructed in an ad hoc way that is sound but not complete. In fact, it is common to simply drop all statements from O S that are not expressible in L T , or at least inexpressible parts thereof. This easily leads to incompleteness, as illustrated by the following example extracted from the Galen ontology 2 , slightly simplified for presentation purposes. Let PathoPhen stand for "pathological phenomenon", isConOf for "is consequence of", and hasCon for "has consequence". Galen contains the following statements formulated in the DL ELHI, the first three being concept inclusions and the fourth one a role inclusion:
Hyperhidrosis PathoPhen ∃hasCon.ClammySkin ∃isConOf.PathoPhen PathoPhen ∃hasCon.PathoPhen PrecipitatingFactor hasCon isConOf − .
These imply as a consequence Hyperhidrosis PrecipitatingFactor.
(1)
Assume that this ontology has to be approximated in the fragment ELH of ELHI that does not admit inverse roles. A typical ad hoc approach would be to simply drop the role inclusion in the fourth line, resulting in an incomplete approximation that no longer has Consequence (1). This, however, can easily be fixed by further adding the concept inclusion Hyperhidrosis ∃hasCon. ∃hasCon.∃isConOf.Hyperhidrosis.
(2) as a (partial) substitute of the dropped role inclusion. The aim of this paper is to systematically study the structure of complete ontology approximations. There is, however, a major caveat. As we show, complete approximations must be infinite even in rather simple cases. Moreover, while finite approximations exist when the depth of the concept inclusions to be preserved is bounded by a constant, the resulting approximations are still of non-elementary size. There is no miraculous way around these facts and thus the approximations constructed in this paper cannot be directly used in applications. However, they provide an important theoretical foundation that enable and guide informed decisions when constructing incomplete approximations in practice. In the above example taken from Galen, for instance, concept inclusion (2) is part of the complete approximation proposed in this paper and thus an explicit candidate for inclusion also in approximations constructed in practice.
As the source DL L S , we consider the expressive Horn DL Horn-SRIF and fragments thereof. As the target DL L T , we consider ELR ⊥ and corresponding fragments thereof, where ELR ⊥ denotes the extension of the more widely known DL ELH ⊥ with role inclusions of the form r 1 • · · · • r n r. Subsumption is EXPTIME-complete in all considered source DLs and PTIME-complete in all cosidered target DLs [Baader et al., 2005; Krötzsch et al., 2013] . While our approximations do not aim at efficient reasoning, we thus support ontology designers who build an ontology in a tractable DL and want to import in a well-understood way from an existing ontology formulated in a computationally more expensive DL.
We provide the following results. In Section 3, we construct ELF-to-EL approximations, thus approximating away functional roles. We then proceed to ELHI-to-ELH, approximating away inverse roles, where the I typeset in small font means that inverse roles are admitted only in role inclusions of the form r s − but not in concept inclusions. This is a very common way to use inverse roles in practice, for example more than 96% of the ontologies in BioPortal that use inverse roles at all use them only in this form and this is similar for other ontology repositories. We next treat ELHIF ⊥to-ELH ⊥ under a certain syntactic assumption that restricts the interplay of role inclusions, functional roles, and inverse roles in O S . This covers also other relevant subcases such as ELHF-to-ELH, without syntactic restrictions. All approximations constructed in Section 3 are non-projective and also provide finite approximations in the depth bounded case. The completeness proofs are non-trivial and use a version of the chase that is specifically tailored to our approximation schemes.
In Section 4, we present ELRIF ⊥ -to-ELR ⊥ approximations. The presented approximations are non-projective when O S is inverse closed, meaning that for every role name r in O S , there is a role namer that is defined via role inclusions to be the inverse of r. This also yields projective approximations for the case where inverse closedness is not assumed and for the Horn-SRIF-to-ELR ⊥ case through a wellknown normalization procedure. The completeness proof is again non-trivial, but based on a different approach, namely a novel connection between ontology approximation and the axiomatizations of quasi-equations valid in classes of semilattices with operators (SLOs) [Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2013; Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2017; Kikot et al., 2017] .
We then proceed to study ELI ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ approximations in Section 5. In contrast to the cases considered before, where (after normalization) both L S and L T are based on the concept language EL ⊥ , here the concept language of L S is different from the one of L T . We present non-projective approximations for unrestricted ontologies O S and for ontologies O S which are in the well-known normal form for ELI ⊥ ontologies that avoids syntactic nesting of concepts. The two approximation schemes are remarkably different.
In Section 6, we show that finite approximations are not guaranteed to exist and that there are cases where depth bounded approximations must be non-elementary in size.
Proof details are available in the appendix, which is available at http://www.informatik.uni-bremen.de/tdki/.
Related Work. Approximation in a DL context was first studied in [Selman and Kautz, 1996] where FL concepts are approximated by FL − concepts and in [Brandt et al., 2002] where ALC concepts are approximated by ALE concepts. In both cases, the approximation always exists, but ontologies are not considered. An incomplete approach to approximating SHOIN ontologies in DL-Lite F is presented in [Pan and Thomas, 2007] and complete (projective) approximations of SROIQ ontologies in DL-Lite A are given in [Botoeva et al., 2010] . Such approximations are guaranteed to exist due to the limited expressive power of DL-Lite A . In [Lutz et al., 2012] , approximation of ELU ontologies in terms of EL ontologies is studied, the main result being that it is EXPTIME-hard and in 2EXPTIME to decide whether a finite complete approximation exists. An incomplete approach to approximating SROIQ ontologies in EL ++ is in [Ren et al., 2010] . There are also approaches towards efficient DL reasoning that involve computing approximations which are intentionally incomplete to avoid compromising efficiency [Schaerf and Cadoli, 1995; Groot et al., 2005; Carral et al., 2014] . Related to approximation is the problem whether a given L S ontology can be equivalently rewritten into the fragment L T of L S , either non-projectively [Lutz et al., 2011] or projectively [Konev et al., 2016] ; note that this asks whether we have to approximate at all.
Preliminaries
Let N C and N R be disjoint and countably infinite sets of concept and role names. A role is a role name r or an inverse role r − , with r a role name. A Horn-SRIF concept inclusion (CI) is of the form L R, where L and R are concepts defined by the syntax rules
with A ranging over concept names and ρ over roles. The depth of a concept R or L is the nesting depth of the constructors ∃ρ and ∀ρ. For example, the concept ∃r.B ∃r.∃s.A is of depth 2. A Horn-SRIF ontology O is a set of • Horn-SRIF concept inclusions,
• functionality assertions func(ρ), and • role inclusions (RIs) ρ 1 • · · · • ρ n ρ. We adopt the standard restriction that if n ≥ 2, then neither O |= func(ρ) nor O |= func(ρ − ). The semantics of Horn-SRIF is standard, see [Baader et al., 2017] . While ontologies used in practice have to be finite, in this paper we shall frequently consider also infinite ontologies. W.l.o.g,, we generally assume that the ⊥ concept occurs only in CIs of the form C ⊥, where C does not contain ⊥.
We briefly introduce the relevant fragments of Horn-SRIF, for details see [Baader et al., 2017 ]. An ELI ⊥ concept is built according to the syntax rule for L above, but omitting disjunction. An ELRIF ⊥ ontology is a Horn-SRIF ontology in which both the left-and right-hand sides of CIs are ELI ⊥ concepts. ELHIF ⊥ is defined likewise, but admitting only role hierarchies instead of role inclusions, which take the form r s. Fragments of ELRIF ⊥ and ELHIF ⊥ can obtained by dropping expressive means that are identified by a standard naming scheme: H indicates role hierarchies, R role inclusions, I inverse roles, F functionality assertions, and · ⊥ the bottom concept. It should thus be understood, for example, what an ELI ⊥ ontology is and what an EL concept is. Among these DLs, ELR ⊥ is maximal with a tractable subsumption problem. In all of the above DLs not contained in ELR ⊥ , subsumption is EXPTIME-complete [Baader et al., 2005; Baader et al., 2008] .
A signature Σ is a set of concept and role names, uniformly referred to as symbols. When speaking of EL(Σ) concept, we mean EL concepts that only use symbols from Σ, and likewise for other DLs. We use sig(O) to denote the set of symbols used in ontology O.
We now define the central notions of this paper. Definition 1 Let O S be a Horn-SRIF ontology with sig(O S ) = Σ and let L T be any of the fragments of Horn-
for all concept inclusions, role inclusions, and functionality assertions α that fall within L T and use only symbols from Σ. ∃reportsTo m−1 . ).
In practice, it clearly does not make sense to include all these CIs in the approximation. Similarly to the example in the introduction, though, it may pay off to include some of them. Choosing the right ones requires a careful inspection of the ontology and application at hand.
With L S -to-L T approximation, L S an ontology language and L T a fragment thereof, we mean the task of approximating an L S ontology in L T . We call L S the source DL and L T the target DL. An alternative definition of approximations is obained by dropping the restriction that α can use only symbols from Σ. We do not use that definition because then even in the 1-bounded case, finite approximations might not exist. Example 2 Take the ELI ontology O S = {∃r − .A B}. Then O |= A ∃r.X ∃r.(B X) for each of the infinitely many concept names X ∈ N C . Thus, every (projective or non-projective) 1-bounded EL approximation of O S must be infinite under the alternative definition of approximation. We now make some basic observations regarding approximations. The proof is straightforward. Lemma 1 Let O S be a Horn-SRIF ontology with sig(O S ) = Σ and L T a fragment of Horn-SRIF. Then
Point 1 may be viewed as an alternative definition of (nonprojective) approximations. Point 2 is important because it sometimes allows us to concentrate on bounded approximations in proofs. The following is well-known, see for example [Bienvenu et al., 2016] . Lemma 2 Given a Horn-SRIF ontology O S with sig(O) = Σ, one can construct in polynomial time an ELRIF ⊥ ontology O S with sig(O S ) ⊇ Σ that entails the same Horn-SRIF(Σ) concept inclusions, role inclusions, and functionality assertions.
The construction of the ontology O S from Lemma 2 requires the introduction of fresh concept names. Still, everybounded L T approximation of O S is a projective -bounded L T approximation of O S .
Depth Bounded Approximation
The goal of this section is to study non-projective approximations in various DLs, both in the unbounded case and in the depth bounded case. We start with approximating away functionality assertions, then inverse roles, and finally their combination (assuming a certain syntactic restriction), also admitting role hierarchies and the bottom concept. This stepby-step approach aims to facilitate presentation and in fact the final theorem in this section subsumes the earlier ones and is the only one that we prove explicitly.
We start with ELF-to-EL approximation. Let C be an EL concept and k ≥ 0. A leaf occurrence of a concept name A in C means an occurrence of A inside a conjunction that does not contain conjuncts of the form ∃r.D. For example, all occurrences of A in A B and in B ∃r.(A B) are leaf occurrences, but the occurrence of A in A B ∃r. is not. By decorating C with subconcepts from O S at leaves, we mean to replace any number of leaf occurrences of a concept name A by a concept A D 1 · · · D k where D 1 , . . . , D k are concepts that occur in O S , possibly as subconcepts. 
Note that the construction of O T is entirely syntactic, that is, it involves no reasoning. Due to Point 2, O T is infinite when = ω. On the other hand, O T is finite when < ω and thus Theorem 1 proves the existence of finite depth bounded non-projective approximations in the ELF-to-EL case. It is interesting to remark that Theorem 1 also reproves the upper bound for subsumption in ELF: first extend the ontology so that it suffices to decide subsumption between concept names, then compute the 0-bounded approximation which is of single exponential size, and then decide subsumption in EL in PTIME [Baader et al., 2005] . Note that for = 0, the concepts C 1 , C 2 in Point 2 of Theorem 1 are simply conjunctions of subconcepts from O S . We next consider inverse roles. Here, the most basic case is that inverse roles can occur in role inclusions, but not in concepts. As noted in the introduction, this case actually occurs rather frequently in practice. To indicate the restricted use of inverse roles, we typeset the I in a smaller font, as in ELHIF and ELRIF. The most basic case is now that of ELHI-to-ELH approximation. We assume w.l.o.g. that role inclusions only take the two forms r s and r s − . Then O T is an -bounded approximation of O S .
Note that Point 2 is not entirely syntactic, but involves reasoning. It is easy to see and well-known, however, that in ELI deciding whether O S |= r s is in PTIME. We now consider the ELHIF ⊥ -to-ELH ⊥ case which combines functional and inverse roles. It turns out that there are subtle interactions between functional, inverse roles, and role hierarchies which we tame by making the following assumption:
The next theorem is the main result of this section. Theorem 3 Let O S be an ELHIF ⊥ ontology that satisfies (♥), Σ = sig(O S ), and ∈ N ∪ {ω} a depth bound.
Define O T to be the ELH ⊥ ontology that contains, for = max{0, − 1}:
1. all CIs from O S ; 2. all r s such that O S |= r s, r, s role names that occur in O S ; 3. all CIs C 1 ∃r.C 2 ∃r.(C 2 ∃s.C 1 ) such that O S |= r s − , ∃s.C 1 is a subconcept of O S or an EL(Σ) concept of depth bounded by , and C 2 is an EL(Σ) concept of depth bounded by decorated with subconcepts of O S at leaves; 4. all CIs ∃r 1 .C 1 ∃r 2 .C 2 ∃r 1 .(C 1 C 2 ) such that there is a role name s with O S |= r 1 s, O S |= r 2 s, and func(s) ∈ O S , and C 1 , C 2 are EL(Σ) concepts of depth bounded by decorated with subconcepts of O S at leaves.
It is not hard to see that Theorem 3 implies Theorems 1 and 2. It also settles additional approximation cases such as ELHF ⊥ -to-ELH ⊥ , without syntactic assumptions. Points 2 to 4 require deciding whether O S |= r s (−) , which is EXPTIME-complete in ELHIF ⊥ as can be proved by mutual reduction with subsumption.
It is straightforward to verify that the ontology O T constructed in Theorem 3 is sound as an approximation, that is, O S |= O T . Completeness is non-trivial. It is established by first introducing a version of the chase that is closely tailored towards the construction of O T given in Theorem 3, then showing that the chase is sound and complete regarding the derivation of EL(Σ) CIs of depth bounded by , and finally proving that the CIs in O T can simulate derivations of the chase. With chase, we mean a rule based approach to constructing (infinite) 'canonical models' [Kontchakov and Zakharyaschev, 2014] .
An interesting observation about the proof of Theorem 3 is that it actually yields a more general result than stated in that theorem. Instead of -bounded approximations, one could define Γ-bounded approximations for any set of EL ⊥ -concepts Γ closed under subconcepts, that is, only concepts from Γ are considered in concept inclusions α in Definition 1. We then obtain a version of Theorem 3 in which "concept of depth bounded by or " is replaced with "concept from Γ" (decorated with subconcepts of O S at leaves as needed). While one could choose for Γ the set of all concepts of depth bounded by some , other choices of Γ might be natural, too. For example, if one wants to decide subsumption between compound EL concepts C and D relative to an ELHI ontology O S without resorting to concept names, then one can approximate O S in EL relative to the set Γ of subconcepts of C and D and then check whether O T entails C D. While this is clearly not efficient in practice, it raises the interesting question of how to identify sets Γ that are tailored towards the actual application of an ontology.
We now briefly discuss the case in which the restriction (♥) is dropped. One can prove that we then need to 
Unbounded Approximation
We provide a significant extensions of Theorem 3 for the case of unbounded approximations, using an entirely different strategy for the completeness proof. In particular, we do not assume the (♥) restriction adopted in Theorem 3, admit inverse roles also in concepts, and add general role inlusions both to the source and target DL, that is, we consider ELRIF ⊥ -to-ELR ⊥ approximation. There is a small price that we have to pay for this generality: the approximations constructed here are projective as for every role name from the original ontology, they contain a (potentially fresh) role name that represents its inverse. It is remarkable that this rather mild form of projectiveness overcomes several problems from the purely non-projective case.
An ELRIF ⊥ ontology O is inverse closed, that is, for every role name r in O, there is a role namer such that O contains r r − andr r − . We provide non-projective approximations under the assumption that the source ontology is inverse closed. This also yields projective approximations for source ontologies that are not inverse closed because we can first extend O S with the required role namesr and then approximate. Note that in practice, there are relevant examples of ontologies that are inverse closed such as Galen. If our source is inverse closed, we can further assume that there are no other occurrences of inverse roles in O S , neither in concept inclusions nor in other role inclusions. In other words, our source ontology is formulated in ELRIF ⊥ . Theorem 4 Let O S be an inverse closed ELRIF ⊥ ontology and Σ = sig(O S ). Define O T to be the ELR ⊥ ontology that contains for all EL(Σ) concepts C, D:
1. all CIs in O S ; 2. all RIs r s with O S |= r s, r, s ∈ Σ role names; 3. all RIs r 1 • · · · • r n r andr n • · · · •r 1 r such that r 1 • · · · • r n r ∈ O S with n ≥ 2; 4. all CIs C ∃r.D ∃r.(D ∃r.C); 5. all CIs ∃r.C ∃r.D ∃r.(C D) such that func(r) ∈ O S ; 6. all CIs ∃r.∃r.C C such that func(r) ∈ O S .
Then O T is an ELR ⊥ approximation of O S .
Note that Points 1 to 3 essentially take over the part of O S that is expressible in ELR ⊥ , Point 4 aims at capturing the consequences of inverse roles, Point 5 at functional roles, and Point 6 at the interaction between functional roles and inverse roles. Points 4 to 6 all introduce infinitely many CIs. Via Lemma 2, Theorem 4 also yields projective approximations for the Horn-SRIF-to-ELR ⊥ case.
The following example shows that the CIs in Point 5 of Theorem 3, which unlike Point 5 of Theorem 4 mix functional roles and role inclusions, are implied by the ontology O T constructed in Theorem 4. The example also illustrates the strength of the 'inverse closed' property.
Example 3 Let r 1 s, r 2 s, func(s) ∈ O S , and let C 1 , C 2 be EL-concepts. We aim to show that
Due to Points 2 and 5 in Theorem 4, it suffices to show that
This CI, in turn, can be proved from O T as follows:
It is straightforward to show that the ontology O T from Theorem 4 is sound as an approximation. To prove completeness, we establish a novel connection between EL ⊥ approximations and axiomatizations of the quasi-equations that are valid in classes of semilattices with operators (SLOs) [Jackson, 2004; Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2017; Kikot et al., 2017] . Roughly speaking, an approximation is obtained from such an axiomatization by instantiating its equations, which correspond (in the sense of modal correspondence theory) to the role inclusions in the original ontology, with EL concepts.
Inverse Roles in Concept Inclusions
As discussed before Theorem 4, the approximations provided by that theorem also cover the case where inverse roles are admitted in concept inclusions. This is achieved, however, by first making the ontology inverse closed and then dropping inverse roles from CIs. Here, we investigate alternative approaches in the basic case of ELI ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ , both nonprojectively and projectively, in the latter case using a wellknown normal form for ELI ⊥ ontologies that avoids syntactic nesting [Baader et al., 2017] .
A key to constructing non-projective approximations is the observation that concepts of the form ∃r − .C can be used as a marker that is invisible to EL ⊥ .
B}. Then O S |= C C for all EL concepts C, C where C is obtained from C by decorating with B any node that is reachable in C from a node decorated with A along an r-path (we view an EL concept as a tree in the standard way, see for example [Konev et al., 2018] ).
We now give a non-projective approximation that captures the effect demonstrated in Example 4. For an ELI ⊥ ontology O S , let cl EL (O S ) denote the set of all EL concepts that can be obtained by starting with a subconcept of a concept from O S and then replacing every subconcept of the form ∃r − .D with . Let C be an EL concept. An EL concept C is a cl EL (O S ) decoration of C if it can be obtained from C by conjunctively adding concepts from cl EL (O S ) to a single occurrence of a subconcept in C.
Theorem 5 Let O S be an ELI ⊥ ontology and Σ = sig(O S ). Define O T to be the EL ⊥ ontology O T that contains for all EL(Σ) concepts C:
We prove completeness by a chase based approach. The CIs in Theorem 5 are rather different from those that we have used in Sections 3 and 4 to deal with inverse roles. In a sense, they provides less guidance for constructing approximations in practice because the CIs that need to be considered are less constrained than those in Sections 3 and 4. We do not know whether it is possible to non-projectively approximate away inverse roles in concept constructors using more constrained CIs. Instead, we observe that we can get back to the same CI scheme for inverse roles by assuming the source ontology O S to be in normal form, that is, all CIs in O S have one of the forms 
It is straightforward to verify that O T is sound. To prove completeness, we again use a chase based strategy.
Size of Approximations
We prove that finite (unbounded) approximations are not guaranteed to exist and that depth bounded approximations can be non-elementary in size. These results hold both for projective and non-projective approximations and for all combinations of source and target DL considered in this paper. The ontologies used to prove these results are simple and show that also for most ontologies that occur in practical applications, neither finite (complete) approximations nor depth bounded (complete) approximations of elementary size can be expected. We focus on the cases ELIH-to-ELH, ELHFto-ELH, and ELHI-to-ELH, starting with unbounded approximations. Theorem 7 None of the ontologies
To get an idea of the proof, consider O S = {∃r − .A B} and let O T be a projective ELH approximation of O S . For all n ≥ 0, let C n = ∃r n . , where ∃r n denotes n-fold nesting of an existential restriction, and observe that
To establish the desired result, we prove that for every n ≥ 0,
We next show that bounded depth approximations can be non-elementary in size. The function tower : N × N → N is defined as tower(0, n) := n and tower(k + 1, n) := 2 tower(k,n) . The size of a (finite) ontology is the number of symbols needed to write it, with concept and role names counting as one. We use Γ n to denote a fixed finite tautological set of EL concept inclusions that contains the symbols
Theorem 8 Let n ≥ 0 and let O n be the union of Γ n with any of the following sets:
For every ≥ 1, any -bounded projective ELH approximation O T of O n must be of size at least tower( , n).
Conclusion
It remains an open problem to develop informative nonprojective approximations for (unrestricted) ELHIF ⊥ -to-ELH ⊥ or even for Horn-SHIF-to-ELH ⊥ and Horn-SRIF-to-ELR ⊥ . It would also be interesting to further extend the expressive power of both the source and target DLs. For example, nominals and range restrictions could be added even without compromising tractability of the latter [Baader et al., 2005] . We remark that Theorem 4 can be adapted to the extension ELR dr ⊥ of ELR ⊥ with range restrictions as the target DL by additionally including in O T the range restriction ran(r) ∃r. for every role name r in O S . Once more, inverse closedness pays off here, and a corresponding extension of Theorem 3 is much more challenging.
There are many other relevant approximation cases that we did not touch upon, including the approximation of non-Horn DLs such as ALC, SHIQ, and SROIQ in (tractable and intractable) Horn DLs. It would further be of interest to understand how approximations can be better tailored towards relevant applications, for example in the spirit of choosing a set Γ of relevant concepts as discussed in Section 3. A Details for Section 2
References
We give an example of a ELI ontology with a finite projective EL approximation but no finite non-projective EL approximation.
Example 5 Consider the ELI ontology
Then
B Details for Section 3
Theorem 9 Given an ELHF-ontology O and roles r, s, it is EXPTIME-complete to decide whether O S |= r s.
Proof. The theorem is proved by mutual reduction with subsumption between concept names A, B relative to an ELHFontology O. Such reductions are easy since we have that
A, B fresh concept names. J
B.1 The Chase
We start with introducing ABoxes, which the chase procedure uses as a data structure. Let N I be a countably infinite set of individual names disjoint from N C and N R . An ABox is a finite set of concept assertions A(a), and role assertions r(a, b) where A ∈ N C , r ∈ N R , and a, b ∈ N I . We use Ind(A) to denote the set of individual names that occur in the ABox A. An interpretation I satisfies a concept assertion A(a) if a ∈ A I and a role assertion r(a, b) if (a, b) ∈ r I . Note that we adopt the standard names assumption here, which implies the unique name assumption. An interpretation if a model of an ABox if it satisfies all assertions in it. For an ontology O, ABox A, a ∈ Ind(A), and 
Note that the rule R3 is parameterized by a depth bound that is assumed to be identical to the depth bound used in the construction of O T . It can be verified that when the chase is started on a ditree-shaped ABox, then all ABoxes produced are ditree-shaped; in particular, 'backwards edges' as enforced by role inclusions of the form r s − are not made explicit, but only treated implicitly.
The chase applies the above rules exhaustively in a fair way. We assume that rules are not applied when its postcondition is already satisfied. For example, R3 is not applied when A |= ∃s.C(b). Using database theory parlance, one could say that our chase is not oblivious. This has the (undesired) consequence that the result of the chase, obtained in the limit by exhaustive and fair rule application, is not unique as it depends on the order in which rules are applies. However, all possible results are homomorphically equivalent and for the constructions in this paper, it does not matter which of the many possible results we use. For simplicity, we thus pretend that the outcome of the chase is unique and denote it with chase O (A). The (desired) consequence of not being oblivious is that the (infinite) ABox chase O (A) has finite outdegree.
The following lemma implies that the chase is (sound and) complete regarding consequences formulated in terms of EL concepts of depth bounded by . It is, however, incomplete regarding deeper EL concepts and regarding consequences formulated in ELI.
Lemma 3 Let O be an ELHIF ⊥ ontology and A a ditreeshaped ABox with root a 0 . Then
Proof. We consider both points simultaneously. The "if" directions are straightforward. In fact, it suffices to show that whenever an ABox A is obtained from a ditree-shaped ABox A by application of one of the rules, then every model of A and O is also a model of A and O. This is straightforward using a case distinction according to which rule is applied and easy semantic arguments.
For the (contrapositive of the) "only if" directions, assume that there are no C ⊥ ∈ O and a ∈ Ind(A) such that chase O (A) |= C(a), respectively that chase O (A) |= C(a 0 ). We show how to construct a model J of A and O such that for all a ∈ Ind(A) and EL concepts C, chase O (A) |= C(a) implies a / ∈ C J . This implies that A is consistent with O (since ⊥ occurs in O only in the form C ⊥), respectively that A, O |= C(a 0 ).
Let ∼ be the smallest equivalence relation on the individuals in chase O (A) such that whenever chase O (A) contains r(a, b 1 ) and r(a, b 2 ) with func(r), then b 1 ∼ b 2 . Clearly, for any equivalence class of ∼, there is an individual a such that all individuals of the class are successors of a in the ditree chase O (A). We call a the predecessor of the class.
Claim 1. Every equivalence class of ∼ contains a maximal individual.
It is clear that the outdegree of the ditree chase O (A) is finite and thus each equivalence class {b 1 , . . . , b k } of ∼ is finite since all individuals in it have a common predecessor. Assume that the class does not contain a maximal individual. Then there must be b i1 , b i2 in the class and EL con-
. But this situation is impossible since R4 was applied exhaustively.
Let Next, let A 2 be obtained from A 1 as follows: ( † 2 ) whenever b 1 and b 2 are successors of a with b 1 ∼ b 2 and ρ(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 1 , then add ρ(a, b 1 ) .
Note that ( † 2 ) may add both upwards and downwards edges, but it does not add functional or inverse functional upwards edges. In fact, let r ab2 be the primary role name between a and b 2 , that is, t(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 0 implies O |= r ab2 t. Such a role name must exist by definition of the chase: r abi is the role name from the first edge that the chase has introduced between a and b 2 and all remaining edges were added later by R2. Now observe that r ab2 ρ and thus if ρ is an inverse role then by (♥) it can neither be functional nor inverse functional.
Finally, let A 3 be obtained from A 2 as follows: ( † 3 ) for every individual a and every ∼-equivalence class {b 1 , . . . , b k } of which a is the predecessor: choose a maximum individual b i and remove all edges r(a, b j ) and subtrees rooted at b j , j = i. For brevity, let A 0 = chase O (A). We prove the following central claim:
Claim 2. For every EL concept C that is a subconcept of O or of depth bounded by , every a ∈ ∆ I , and i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
We distinguish the cases i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In all cases, the proof is by induction on the structure of C and the only interesting case is that C is of the form ∃s.D.
Case i = 0. Since the "only if" direction is clear, we concentrate on "if". Assume that A 1 |= ∃s.D(a) and let Case i = 1. Since the "only if" direction is clear, we concentrate on "if". First assume that ρ is a role name s. Thus assume that A 2 |= ∃s.D(a) and let s(a, b) ∈ A 2 with A 2 |= D(b). The induction hypothesis and Case i = 0 yield A 0 |= D(b). The interesting case is that s(a, b) was added to A 2 by ( † 2 ). Then b is a successor of an individual a and a has another successor b 2 such that s(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 1 and b ∼ b 2 . Since ( † 1 ) adds only upwards edges, s(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 0 . Since b ∼ b 2 , there are individuals c 1 , . . . , c k and role names r 1 , . . . , r k−1 such that
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let r aci be the primary role name between a and c i . We must have
We can thus apply R4 k − 1 times to obtain an individual b such that r ac k (a, b ) ∈ A 0 and A 0 |= D(b ); note in this context that D is of depth at most − 1. We already know that O |= r ac k s and thus R2 yields s(a, b ) ∈ A 0 which implies A 0 |= ∃s.D(a) and thus A 1 |= ∃s.D(a) as required. The case where ρ is an inverse role s − is similar. In fact, the statement "s(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 0 " is then replaced with "t(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 0 for some role name t with t s − ". We can use the same argument as above and add at the end that ( † 1 ) has added s(b , a).
Case i = 2. Here, the "if" direction is clear and we concentrate on "only if". Thus assume that A 2 |= ∃s.D(a) and let s(a, b) ∈ A 2 with A 2 |= D(b). The interesting case is when s(a, b) and the subtree below b was removed by ( † 3 ). By Cases i = 0 and i = 1, A 0 |= D(b). By Claim 1, there is a maximal b from the equivalence class of b and thus A 0 |= D(b ) implying A 2 |= D(b ). Because of ( † 2 ), s(a, b ) ∈ A 2 and thus A 2 |= ∃s.D(a) as required. This finishes the proof of Claim 2.
Let I be A 3 viewed as an interpretation. We first argue that I satisfies all role inclusions in O. Thus let r ρ ∈ I and (a, b) ∈ r I . Then r(a, b) ∈ A 3 . First assume that r(a, b) ∈ A 0 . Then ρ(a, b) ∈ A 0 by R2 and ( † 1 ) and thus ρ(a, b) ∈ A 3 . The case that r(a, b) was added by ( † 1 ) also relies on R2 and ( † 1 ), and the semantics. Now assume that r(a, b) was added by ( † 2 ). There are two cases. Either b is a successor of a and a has another successor b 2 such that b ∼ b 2 and r(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 1 . But then ρ(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 1 and thus ( † 2 ) adds also s(a, b). Or a is a successor of b and b has another successor a 2 such that a ∼ a 2 and r(a, b 2 ) ∈ A 1 . Again, ( † 2 ) adds also s(a, b).
We next show that I satisfies all functionality assertions in O. To see this, assume that (a, b 1 ), (a, b 2 ) ∈ ρ I and func(ρ) ∈ O where ρ is a role name or the inverse thereof. If ρ is an inverse role, we must have b 1 = b 2 as required: since chase O (A) is ditree-shaped, for every individual a there is at most one b with r(b, a) ∈ chase O (A) for every role name r. Since ( † 1 ) and ( † 2 ) do not add inverse functional edges, the same is true for A 3 when func(r − ) ∈ O. Now assume that ρ is a role name r. Since ( † 1 ) and ( † 2 ) do not add functional upwards edges, both edges r(a, b 1 ), r(a, b 2 ) must also be in 
B.2 Completeness
We now prove the completeness part of Theorem 3, starting with some preliminaries. For an ABox A and an interpretation I, a function h : Ind(A) → ∆ I is a homomorphism from A to I if h(a) ∈ A I for every A(a) ∈ A and (h(a), h(b)) ∈ r I for every r(a, b) ∈ A. For two ABoxes A 1 and A 2 , a function h : Ind(A 1 ) → Ind(A 2 ) is a homomorphism from A 1 to A 2 if A(h(a)) ∈ A 2 for every A(a) ∈ A 1 and r(h(a), h(b)) ∈ A 2 for every r(a, b) ∈ A 1 . We recall that every EL concept C can be viewed as a ditree-shaped ABox A C . By convention, we assume that the root individual in such an ABox is a 0 . For example, the EL concept A ∃r.B ∃s. can be viewed as the ABox {A(a 0 ), r(a 0 , b 1 ), B(b 1 ), s(a 0 , b 2 )}. The following is widely known and straightforward to establish.
Lemma 4 Let C be an EL concept, I an interpretation, and d ∈ ∆ I . Then d ∈ C I iff there is a homomorphism h from A C to I with h(a 0 ) = d.
The next lemma is the central step in the completeness proof. It says that the chase introduced above can in a sense be simulated by the statements in the ontology O T .
Lemma 5 Let C be an EL(Σ) concept of depth bounded by decorated with subconcepts of O S at leaves, A 0 , A 1 , . . . the sequence of ABoxes constructed by chase O S (A C ), I a model of O T , and d ∈ C I . Then for every i ≥ 0, there is a homomorphism h i from A i to I with h i (a 0 ) = d.
Proof. The proof is by an induction on the number of applications of the chase rule R3 used to compute the sequence A 0 , . . . , A i . For the induction start, assume that R3 was not applied at all. We show that for all j ≤ i, there is a homomorphism h j from A j to I with h j (a 0 ) = d. For j = 0, it suffices to apply Lemma 4. Now assume that h j has already been constructed, j < i. We show how to find h j+1 , making a case distinction according to the rule that is applied in order to obtain A j+1 from A j .
R1. Then A j |= C(a), C D ∈ O S , and A j+1 is obtained from A j by adding D(a). We must have h j (a) ∈ C I . Since C D is a CI in O T and I is a model of O T , a ∈ D I . Thus h j can be extended to a homomorphism from A j+1 to I in a straightforward way.
R2. Then r(a, b) ∈ A j , O S |= r s, and A j+1 is obtained from A j by adding s(a, b). We have r s ∈ O T and thus h j+1 = h j is a homomorphism from A j+1 to I.
Consequently, h j (a) ∈ ∃r 1 .(C 1 C 2 ) I . We can thus extend h j to the desired homomorphism h j+1 from A j+1 to I in a straightforward way. Now for the induction step. Assume that there were k > 0 applications of R3 in the sequence A 0 , . . . , A i and that the last such application was used to obtain A p+1 from A p , p < i. By induction hypothesis, we find a homomorphism h p from A p to I with h p (a 0 ) = d. We argue that we also find such a homomorphism h p+1 from A p+1 to I. We can then proceed as in the induction start to obtain the desired homomorphism from A i to I.
Since R3 was applied, there are r(a, b) ∈ A p , a role name s, and an EL concept C with ∃s.C a subconcept of O S or of depth bounded by such that A p |= C (a), O S |= r s − , and A p+1 is obtained from A p by adding ∃s.C (b). Since A p is ditree-shaped, a is the predecessor of b. By definition of the chase, there is a primary role name r ab between a and b, as in the proof of Lemma 3: for every t(a, b) ∈ A p , we have O S |= r ab t and thus also O T |= r ab t. It suffices to show that there is a to assertions that only use individuals from Ind extended by adding E(c) whenever E is a subconcept of O S and c is a fringe individual such that A p |= E(c), and let C b be this ABox viewed as an EL concept. We must have h p (b) ∈ C I b and thus h p (a) ∈ (C ∃r ab .C b ) I . Since ∃s.C is a subconcept of O S or of depth at most and C b is an EL concept of depth at most (by construction and because C is of depth bounded by ; recall that = max{ − 1, 0}) decorated with subconcepts of O S at leaves, C ∃r ab .
, as in the construction of A p+1 . By Lemma 4, there is a homomorphism
To this end, consider each fringe individual c. Let C c be the EL concept that is the conjunction of all subconcepts E of O S with A b |= E(c). We can extract from the chase sequence A 0 , . . . , A p a chase sequence that constructs A p | c starting from A Cc and uses at most k − 1 applications of special rules. From the induction hypothesis and since clearly h b (c) ∈ C I c , we thus obtain a homomorphism h c from A c to I with h c (c) = h b (c). It is now straightforward to combine our initial h b with all the homomorphisms h c into the desired homomorphism h b from A p+1 | b to I. J
We are now ready to prove completeness of the approximation constructed in Theorem 3. It is immediate by construction of O T that O S |= r s implies O T |= r s for all role names r, s ∈ Σ. it thus remains to show the following.
Lemma 6 O S |= C D implies O T |= C D for all EL(Σ) concepts C of depth at most and EL ⊥ concepts D.
Proof. By Point 2 of Lemma 1 and construction of O T , it suffices to consider the case < ω. Assume O S |= C D with C, D as in Lemma 6 and let I be a model of O T with d ∈ C I . We have to show that d ∈ D I . First assume that the ABox A C is consistent with O S . By Point 2 of Lemma 3, chase O S (A C ) |= D(a 0 ). Let A C = A 0 , A 1 , . . . be the sequence of ABoxes generated by the chase when started on A C . Then chase O S (A C ) |= D(a 0 ) implies that there is an A i with A i |= D(a 0 ). An analogue of Lemma 4 for homomorphisms into ABoxes thus yields a homomorphism h from A D to A i with h(a 0 ) = a 0 (defined in the expected way). By Lemma 5, there further is a homomorphism h from A i to I with h(a 0 ) = d. Composing these, we obtain a homomorphism from A D to I that maps a 0 to d and applying Lemma 4 yields d ∈ D I , as required. Now assume that A C is inconsistent with O S . Then by Point 1 of Lemma 3, there are C ⊥ ∈ O S and a ∈ Ind(A) with chase O S (A) |= C (a). We can argue as above that there is a homomorphism from A C to I, and thus C I = ∅ in contradiction to the facts that I is a model of O T and C ⊥ ∈ O T . J
C Details for Section 4
We show that one can obtain approximations from axiomatizations of the quasi-equations valid in classes of bounded semilattices with operators (SLOs). Theorem 4 is an instance of a general result stating that, under certain conditions, by identifying CIs with equations in the theory of SLOs, the substitution instances of the equations used in an axiomatization provide the additional CIs needed to approximate ontologies. This link between approximation and algebra can be used in a number of different ways: (1) existing axiomatization results can be used directly, as a black box, to obtain approximations;
(2) if no axiomatization is available yet for the conditions on roles expressed in a DL of interest, the algebraic machinery can be used to determine a new axiomatization and, thereby, the corresponding approximation;
(3) 'negative' results from algebra can be used to show that certain natural candidates for approximations do not work.(4) conversely, one can use approximation results to obtain axiomatizations of classes of SLOs. In fact, the direct approximation proofs presented above provide a novel technique for obtaining axiomatizations of classes of SLOs. Note that the link to algebra does not provide any depth bounded approximations from axiomatizations. This section is structured as follows. After introducing the relevant algebraic notation, we prove a general result linking approximations to complex equational theories of SLOs, where an equational theory Ax of SLOs is complex if every SLO validating Ax can be respresented by subsets (complexes) of an interpretation validating Ax. This link is proved for equational theories of SLOs corresponding to arbitrary first-order conditions on roles. We then prove that any set P of functionality assertions and role inclusions that is inverse closed corresponds to a complex equational theory and apply this result to prove Theorem 4. We introduce the relevant notation for semilattices with operators. A bounded semilattice with monotone operators (SLO) is an algebraic structure
and R is a set of role names such that the unary operators ♦ A r , r ∈ R, satisfy the equation
In a SLO A, the partial order ≤ A is defined as usual by taking a ≤ A b iff a ∧ A b = a, for all a, b in A. It is readily seen that 
is true under all valuations under which α 1 , . . . , α n are true. Equational theories of SLOs have been investigated in [Jackson, 2004; Beklemishev, 2014; Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2017; Kikot et al., 2017] .
Every SLO term τ defines an EL ⊥ concept τ C by replacing every variable x with a concept name A x , and the connectives ∧ and ♦ r with and ∃r, respectively. For example, (♦ r x ∧ ) C = ∃r.A x . Then any SLO equation α = (σ ≤ τ ) defines the CI α C = σ C τ C . We denote by · T the obvious converse of · S associating with every EL ⊥ concept C (CI α) a SLO term C T (SLO equation α T , respectively). For example,
We are in the position now to formulate the fundamental equivalence of EL ⊥ TBox reasoning and the validity of SLO quasi-equations [Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2017; Kikot et al., 2017] . Theorem 10 For any EL ⊥ ontology O and CI C D: O |= C D iff α∈O α T → (C D) T is valid in all SLOs.
Theorem 9 and the correspondence between axiomatizations and approximations we are after are proved by showing that every SLO (validating a set Ax of equations) can be represented by the set of subsets of a DL interpretation (satisfying a role constraint P corresponding to Ax). In detail, every interpretation I defines a SLO I + over any set R of role names by setting [Goldblatt, 1989] :
that the definition of the SLO I + does not depend on the interpretation of concept names in I. Therefore, we mostly define the SLO F + for frames F, interpretations in which A F = ∅ for all concept names A. One can apply algebraic notation to interpretations in a straightforward way.
For example, we say that a SLO equation or quasi-equation is valid in I if it is valid in the algebra I + . It is known that natural contraints on the interpretation of roles can be captured by the validity of SLO equations. For example, if r, s are role names, then r is included in s in an interpretation I iff the equation ♦ r x ≤ ♦ s x is valid in I. Formally, call a set P of first-order sentences using role names as binary predicates a role constraint. Then we say that a role constraint P corresponds to a set Ax of SLO equations if any interpretation I satisfies P iff I + |= α, for all α ∈ Ax. The table below gives a sample set of role constraints and the corresponding SLO equations. These correspondences are well known from correspondence theory in modal logic and are, in particular, instances of the correspondence part of Sahlqvist's Theorem [van Benthem, 1984; Blackburn et al., 2001] . We refer the reader to [Sofronie-Stokkermans, 2017; Kikot et al., 2017] for more examples.
Role constraint
Equation
The following example illustrates how we use these correspondences to determine approximations. 
It is easy to see that correpondence of func(r) to α entails
, however, does not follow from correspondence and requires significantly more work -which we discuss next.
We develop a necessary and sufficient condition for when equations Ax corresponding to a role constraint P provide a EL ⊥ approximation of ontologies of the form O ∪ P , where O is a set of EL ⊥ CIs.
A homomorphism h between SLOs A 1 and A 2 is a mapping h from the domain A 1 of A 1 to the domain A 2 of A 2 preserving all operations, for example h(♦ A1 r a) = ♦ A2 r h(a) for all a ∈ A 1 and r ∈ R. An embedding is an injective homomorphism. A set Ax of SLO equations is complex if for every SLO A validating Ax there exists a frame F validating Ax such that A can be embedded into F + . Thus, if Ax is complex, then every SLO A validating Ax can be regarded as a system of sets (aka complexes) over a frame validating Ax. Call Ax quasi-equation complete if a quasi-equation is valid in all SLOs validating Ax just in case it is valid in all SLOs of the form I + validating Ax. It can be proved that a set Ax of SLO equations is complex iff it is quasi-equation complete [Kikot et al., 2017] . Theorem 9 can be proved by showing that the empty set of SLO equations is complex. In other words, the empty role constraint P corresponds to the empty complex set Ax of equations. For an equation α = (σ ≤ τ ) we denote by α Σ the set of all CIs obtained from α C by uniformly substituting every A x in α C by any EL ⊥ (Σ) concept D. Let Ax Σ denote the union of all α Σ , α ∈ Ax. We are now in the position to formulate the announced criterion for approximations. Observe that the approximations only depend on the role constraint of the ontology and not on its CIs. Theorem 11 [Approximation/Axiomatization] Let P be a role constraint and Ax a set of SLO equations corresponding to P . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
Proof. We first show that (2) implies (1). Assume Ax is complex and let O be an EL ⊥ ontology and with Σ = sig(O∪ P ). We have to show that for all EL ⊥ (Σ) concepts C, D:
The direction (⇐) follows from the observation that every interpretation satisfying P validates Ax and, therefore, satisfies all CIs in Ax Σ . Conversely, assume that O ∪ Ax Σ |= C D. Take an interpretation I satisfying O ∪ Ax Σ such that I |= C D. Let R be the set of role names in Σ. Define the SLO A = (A, ∧ A , ⊥ A , A , (♦ A r | r ∈ R)) as the restriction of the SLO I + to {C I | sig(C) ⊆ Σ}. In more detail,
) ∈ r I } Then A validates Ax: to see this let v be a valuation in A. By definition, for every variables x there exists a EL ⊥ (Σ) concept C x with v(x) = C I x . Let σ ≤ τ ∈ Ax. Obtain σ s and τ s from σ C and τ C by substituting every A x by C x . Then σ s τ s ∈ Ax Σ . Thus I |= σ s τ s and so A |= v σ ≤ τ , as required.
As Ax is complex, there exists a frame G validating Ax such that there is an embedding h from A into G + . Extend G to an interpretation J by setting A J = h(A I ) for every concept name A. Then J is a model of O validating Ax and refuting C D. Thus, J is a model of O and P and refuting C D.
We now show that (1) implies (3). Assume Ax is not quasi-equation complete. Take A validating Ax and a quasiequation α 1 ∧ · · · ∧ α n → α such that (a) A |= α 1 ∧ · · · ∧ α n → α; (b) I |= α 1 ∧ · · · ∧ α n → α for all I validating Ax.
We may assume that all variables and ♦ r used in α are used in some α i . Let v be a valuation in A such that α 1 , . . . , α n are true in A under v and α is refuted in A under v. Take a frame F such that A is embedded into F + via an injective homomorphism h. Define a model J by expanding F by setting A J x = h(v(x)), for all variables x in α 1 , . . . , α n , α.
Let O = {α T 1 , . . . , α T n } and Σ = sig(O ∪ P ). Then I is a model of Ax Σ (since A validates Ax) and I |= α T . It follows that O ∪ Ax Σ |= α T . However, by Point (b), O ∪ P |= α T .
The equivalence (2) ⇔ (3) is proved in [Kikot et al., 2017] . J
We now exhibit role constraints given by role assertions and inclusions and corresponding axioms that are complex. An application of Theorem 10 then provides the desired approximations. Let P be a set of role assertions and inclusions.
Recall that we call P inverse closed if for every role name r in P there is a role namer such that r r − ,r r − ∈ P and there are no additional occurrences of inverse roles in P . Recall that we assume that P is safe in the sense that for any assertion ρ 1 • · · · • ρ n ρ ∈ P with n ≥ 2 neither P |= func(ρ) nor P |= func(ρ − ) holds.
Theorem 12 Let P be an inverse closed and safe set of functionality assertions and RIs and let Ax contain the following equations, for all role names r, s in P :
5. ♦ r1 · · · ♦ rn x ≤ ♦ r x and ♦r n · · · ♦r 1 x ≤ ♦rx if r 1 •· · ·• r n r ∈ P . Then P corresponds to Ax and Ax is complex.
Proof. Correpondence is straightforward, so we focus on proving that Ax is complex. We start by introducing some equations implied by Ax. We set P |= * func(r) if there exists s such that P |= r s and P |= func(s).
(A) Ax |= ♦ r x ∧ ♦ s ≤ ♦ s x if P |= * func(r) and P |= s r. To see this, assume P |= r u and func(u) ∈ P . Then
Ax |= ♦ r x ∧ ♦ s ≤ ♦ u x ∧ ♦ s by the equations under Point (1.). We have by the equations under Point (3.)
By the equations under Point (4.)
. To see this, assume P |= r u and func(u) ∈ P . Then, by the equations under Point (1.)
By the equations under Point (2.)
Thus, by (A),
. This follows from the equations under Point (1.) and (4.).
We introduce the notion of a filter that is used in the proof.
Now assume A is given. We define a frame F such that there is an embedding from A to F + . Let ∆ F be the set of all filters in A. For any role name r, the definition of r F depends on whether r and/orr are functional:
1. if P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r), then set (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ r F if for all a ∈ A the following hold: (i) ♦ r a ∈ F 1 iff a ∈ F 2 and (ii) ♦ra ∈ F 2 iff a ∈ F 1 .r F is defined as the inverse of r F .
2. if P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r), then set (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ r F if for all a ∈ A the following hold:
3. if P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r), then set (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ r F if for all a ∈ A the following hold:
This finishes the definition of F. We first show that F satisfies P .
• Assume r s ∈ P . We have to check that r s is satisfied in F. If neither P |= * func(s) nor P |= * func(ŝ), then r F ⊆ s F follows directly from the definition and the equations under Point (1.) of Theorem 11. Now assume that P |= * func(s). Then P |= * func(r). Assume (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ r F . We have to show (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ s F . Thus, we first have to show that ♦ s a ∈ F 1 iff a ∈ F 2 . If a ∈ F 2 , then ♦ r a ∈ F 1 . Then ♦ s a ∈ F 1 by the equations under Point (1) of Theorem 11, as required. If ♦ s a ∈ F 1 , then ♦ r a ∈ F 1 since ♦ r ∈ F 1 (by the equations under (A)). Then a ∈ F 2 , as required. Next we make a case distinction: if P |= * func(ŝ), then we have to show that ♦ra ∈ F 2 if a ∈ F 1 . But this follows from P |=r ŝ and the equations under Point (1). If P |= * func(ŝ), then we have to show that ♦ŝa ∈ F 2 iff a ∈ F 1 . This can be proved again using the equations under Point (1) and (A). The case P |= * func(ŝ) is considered in the same way.
• Assume func(r) ∈ P . Then functionality of r F follows directly from the definition. • Assume r 1 • · · · • r n r ∈ P . Let (F 1 , F 2 ) ∈ (r 1 • · · · • r n ) I . As P is safe, we have to show that if ♦ r a ∈ F 1 , then a ∈ F 2 and if ♦ra ∈ F 2 , then a ∈ F 1 . Both can be proved in a straightforward way using the equations under Point (5) of Theorem 11.
It remains to construct an embedding h from A into F + . Define h by setting
for all a ∈ A. It is straightforward to show that h is an injective mapping with
It thus remains to prove that h(♦ A r a) = ♦ F + r h(a) for all role names r. We first assume that P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r). Assume a filter F is given. Suppose ♦ r a 0 ∈ F . We have to show the existence of a filter F with a 0 ∈ F such that (F, F ) ∈ r F . Consider
It suffices to show the existence of a filter F containing X with an empty intersection with Y . To this end it suffices to prove that there is no finite conjunction c of members of X such that c ≤ e for some e ∈ Y . Assume an arbitrary such c is given. It takes the form c = a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ a n ∧ ♦rb 1 ∧ · · · ♦rb m with ♦ r a 1 , . . . , ♦ r a n ∈ F and b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ F . Then, by the axioms under Point (B), we have ♦ r (a 1 ∧ · · · ∧ a n ) ∈ F . We also have b 1 ∧ · · · ∧ b m ∈ F . Thus we may assume that c = a ∧ ♦rb for some a with ♦ r a ∈ F and b ∈ F . For a proof by contraction first assume that a ∧ ♦rb ≤ a for some a with ♦ r a ∈ F . Then Then from b ∧ ♦ r a ∈ F (since b, ♦ r a ∈ F ) and b ∧ ♦ r a ≤ ♦ r a we obtain ♦ r a ∈ F and we have derived a contradiction. Now assume a ∧ ♦rb ≤ ♦rb for some b ∈ F . Then, by the equations under Point (3.) of Theorem 11 and Point (C) and monotonicity of ♦ r ,
which contradicts the assumptions that b, ♦ r a ∈ F and b ∈ F . Now assume that P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r). Assume a filter F is given. Suppose first ♦ r a 0 ∈ F . We have to show the existence of a filter F with a 0 ∈ F such that (F, F ) ∈ r F . Consider
It suffices to show the existence of a filter F containing X with an empty intersection with Y . To this end it suffices to prove that there is no finite conjunction c of members of X such that c ≤ e for some e ∈ Y . Assume an arbitrary such c is given. As shown above, we may assume that c = a ∧ ♦rb for some a with ♦ r a ∈ F and b ∈ F . Now one can prove that a ∧ ♦rb ≤ a for some a with ♦ r a ∈ F leads to a contradiction in exactly the same way as above.
Suppose now that ♦ra 0 ∈ F . We have to show the existence of a filter F with a 0 ∈ F such that (F , F ) ∈ r F . Consider
It suffices to show the existence of a filter F containing X with an empty intersection with Y . To this end it suffices to prove that there is no finite conjunction c of members of X such that c ≤ e for some e ∈ Y . We may assume that c = a 0 ∧ ♦ r a for some a ∈ F . Assume that a 0 ∧ ♦ r a ≤ ♦ r a for some a ∈ F . Then by the equations under Point (3.) of Theorem 11 and (C)
which contradicts the assumption that a, ♦ra ∈ F .
Assume that
for some b with ♦rb ∈ F . Then by the equations under Point (3.) of Theorem 11 a ∧ ♦ra 0 ≤ ♦r(a 0 ∧ ♦ r a) ≤ ♦rb which again contradicts the assumption that a, ♦ra ∈ F .
The remaining case in which P |= * func(r) and P |= * func(r) is similar and omitted. J 3. ∃r 1 . · · · ∃r n .C ∃r.C and ∃r n . · · · ∃r 1 .C ∃r.C, if r 1 • · · · • r n r ∈ O S with n ≥ 2; and {r 1 • · · · • r n r} |= ∃r 1 . · · · ∃r n .C ∃r.C and {r 1 • · · · • r n r} |= ∃r n . · · · ∃r 1 .C ∃r.C.
The following examples show that correspondence between role assertions and SLO axioms alone does not imply that the axioms are complex and, therefore, cannot be used to obtain EL ⊥ approximations. They also show that approximations are not compositional. Example 7 Recall that the role assertion P 0 = {r s − } corresponds to the axiom α 0 = (x ∧ ♦ r y ≤ ♦ r (y ∧ ♦ s x)). Using the technique of the proof of Theorem 11, it is straightforward to show that α 0 is complex. Thus, Theorem 10 provides a EL ⊥ approximation of any ontology O ∪ P 0 with O a set of EL ⊥ inclusions. This is not the case if one admits two such role assertions. To show this, consider
Then P 1 corresponds to
is not a EL ⊥ approximation of O 1 . To prove this, observe that
We show that O |= A ∃r 3 .B. Define an interpretation I by setting
• ∆ I = {a, b, c, d};
Observe that one obtains a EL ⊥ approximation of O 1 by adding the axiom ♦ r1 x ≤ ♦ r3 x corresponding to r 1 r 3 to Ax 1 . The next example also refutes compositionality of approximations. In this case for combinations of RIs with functionality assertions. Example 8 Let
Both role assertions in P 2 correspond to complex axioms, namely 
D Details for Section 5
In Section 5, we introduced two ELI ⊥ -to-EL ⊥ approximations. In this section, we deliver further details for both cases.
D.1 The Chase (non-projective)
Let O be an ELI ontology and Σ = sig(O). We again assume that ⊥ occurs only in CIs of the form C ⊥. Starting from an ABox A, the chase exhaustively applies the following rules: R1 If A |= C(a) and C D ∈ O S with D = ⊥, then add D(a) to A. The chase applies this rule exhaustively in a fair way. When the resulting sequence of ABoxes is A = A 0 , A 1 , . . . , we use chase O (A) to denote i≥0 A i . For simplicity, we assume here that the chase is oblivious in the sense that the rule applies even when the consequence A |= D(a) already holds. Consequently, chase O (A) is uniquely defined. The following is easy to establish, details are omitted. Lemma 7 Let O be an ELI ontology and A an ABox. Then
for all ELI concepts C and a ∈ Ind(A). We are going to use the chase on ditree-shaped ABoxes. When started on such an ABox, all generated ABoxes are tree-shaped, that is, the undirected graph G u A = (Ind(A), {{a, b} | r(a, b) ∈ A} is a tree (possibly with multi-edges); they are not guaranteed to be ditree-shaped.
D.2 Completeness (non-projective)
We prove the completeness part of Theorem 5. For a tree-shaped ABox A, we use A ↓ to denote the restriction of A to assertions in which all individuals a are reachable from the root of A along a directed role path, that is, A contains assertions r 0 (a 0 , a 1 ), . . . , r n−1 (a n−1 , a n ) where a 0 is the root of A and a n = a. Lemma 8 Let C be an EL(Σ) concept, A 0 , A 1 , . . . the sequence of ABoxes constructed by chase O S (A C ), I a model of O T , and d ∈ C I . Then for every i ≥ 0, there is a homomorphism h i from A ↓ i to I with h i (a 0 ) = d. Proof. The proof is by induction on i. The induction start is immediate by Lemma 4 and since A 0 = A C . For the induction step, we make a case distinction according to the chase rule applied to obtain A i+1 from A i . R1. Assume the rule was applied to individual a ∈ Ind(A i ) and CI E F ∈ O S . Let F EL be the result of replacing in F every subconcept ∃r − .G with . Moreover, let A ↓,− i be A ↓ i after removal of all role edges that have been added by an application of rule R2, and likewise for A ↓,− i+1 .
Further, let C ↓,− i be A ↓,− i viewed as an EL concept, and likewise for C ↓,− i+1 . Note that A ↓ i+1 is obtained from A ↓ i by adding F EL (a) and thus C ↓,− i+1 is a cl EL (O S ) decoration of C ↓,− i . From Point 2 of Lemma 7, we obtain O S |= C C ↓,− i+1 ; note that this (trivially) holds also when A C is inconsistent with add r(a, b) and B(b) to A, with b fresh. We again use chase O (A) to denote the result of applying the chase of ABox A, which is unique since rule application is oblivious. Note that this chase is the standard chase for ELI except that no new successors are introduced to witness existential restrictions on inverse roles. This is compensated by the semantic entailment in rule R1, which is in line with Point 1 in Theorem 6. We remark that, when applied to a ditree-shaped ABox, all ABoxes produced by the chase are ditree-shaped, possibly with multi-edges. We assume that ⊥ occurs in O only in CIs of the form C ⊥ with C an EL concept. Proof. We prove both point simultaneously, starting with the "if" directions. Let A 0 , A 1 , . . . be the sequence of ABoxes produced by the chase and let I be a model of A and O. We show the following.
Claim For all i ≥ 0, there is a homomorphism from A i to I with h(a 0 ) = a 0 .
This establishes Point 1 because if C ⊥ ∈ O and chase O (A) |= C(a), then there is a k such that A k |= C(a). The existence of h k implies that C I = ∅ (via Lemma 4), in contradiction to I being a model of A and O. Thus, A is inconsistent with O.
It also establishes Point 2. In fact, if chase O (A) |= C(a 0 ), then there is a k such that A k |= C(a 0 ) and h k shows that d ∈ C I as required.
It thus remains to prove the claim. The case i = 0 is trivial as the desired homomorphism is simply the identity on Ind(A). For the case i > 0, we make a case distinction according the the chase rule applied in order to obtain A i+1 from A i .
R1. If this rule was applied to obtain
Because h i is the homomorphism from A i to I, we must have h i (a) ∈ (A 1 · · · A n ) I . Since I is a model of A and O, this yields h i+1 (a) ∈ B I . Consequently h i is also a homomorphism from A i+1 to I and we can set h i+1 = h i .
R2. Then there are r(a, b), A(b) ∈ A i and ∃r.A B ∈ O. A i+1 is obtained from A i by adding B(a). Because h i is the homomorphism from A i to I, we must have h i (b) ∈ A I and (h i (a), h i (b)) ∈ r I . Since I is a model of A and O, h i+1 (a) ∈ B I . Consequently, h i is also a homomorphism from A i+1 to I and we can set h i+1 = h i . For brevity, let Ind denote the set of individual names in the (potentially infinite) ABox chase O (A). Further let I be chase O (A) viewed as an interpretation. Because of rule R1, for each a ∈ Ind we find a model I a of O and a d a ∈ ∆ Ia such that for all concept names A, a ∈ A I iff d a ∈ A Ia . We can further assume that the domains of all interpretations I a are mutually disjoint, and that they are also disjoint from the domain of I. Let J be the interpretation obtained as follows:
R3. If this rule was applied to obtain
1. take the disjoint union of I and all the I a ;
2. for every a ∈ Ind, every role name r, and every (e, d a ) ∈ r Ia , add (e, a) to r J .
It can be verified that, as required, chase O (A) |= C(a) implies a / ∈ C J for all a ∈ Ind(A) and EL concepts C. In fact, it suffices to observe that we have only added new incoming edges to elements from ∆ I but no outgoing ones.
By definition, J is a model of A. To show that it is also a model of O, we make a case distinction on the types of CIs in O: 
D.4 Completeness (projective)
We prove the completeness part of Theorem 6, in analogy with the completeness proof for Theorem 3. Thus the following is crucial.
Lemma 11 Let C be an EL(Σ) concept of depth bounded by , A 0 , A 1 , . . . the sequence of ABoxes constructed by chase O S (A C ), I a model of O T , and d ∈ C I . Then for every i ≥ 0, there is a homomorphism h i from A i to I with h i (a 0 ) = d.
Proof. The proof is by an induction on the number of applications of rule R3 used to compute the sequence A 0 , . . . , A i . For the induction start, assume that R3 was not applied at all. We show that for all j ≤ i, there is a homomorphism h j from A j to I with h j (a 0 ) = d. For j = 0, it suffices to apply Lemma 4. Now assume that h j has already been constructed, j < i. We show how to find h j+1 , making a case distinction according to the rule that is applied in order to obtain A j+1 from A j .
R1. Then there are A 1 (a), . . . , A n (a) ∈ A j such that A 1 . . . A n B ∈ O S and A j+1 is obtained from A j by adding B(a). We must have h j (a) ∈ (A 1 · · · A n ) I . By construction of O T , A 1 . . . A n B is a CI in O T . Since I is a model of O T , a ∈ B I . Thus h j is also a homomorphism from A j+1 to I.
R2
. Then there are r(a, b), A(b) ∈ A j such that ∃r.A B ∈ O and and A j+1 is obtained from A j by adding B(a). We must have h j (b) ∈ A I and (h j (a), h j (b)) ∈ r I . By construction of O T , ∃r.A B is a CI in O T . Since I is a model of O T , a ∈ B I . Thus h j is also a homomorphism from A j+1 to I.
R4
. Then there is an A(a) ∈ A j such that A ∃r.B ∈ O and A j+1 is obtained from A j by adding B(b) and r(a, b), b fresh. We must have h j (a) ∈ A I . By construction of O T , A ∃r.B is a CI in O T . Consequently and since I is a model of O T , there is an e ∈ B I such that (h j (a), e) ∈ r I . Let h j+1 be the extension of h j obtained by setting h j+1 (b) = e. It can be verified that h j+1 is a homomorphism from A j+1 to I. Now for the induction step. Assume that there were k > 0 applications of R3 in the sequence A 0 , . . . , A i and that the last such application was used to obtain A +1 from A , < i. By induction hypothesis, we find a homomorphism h from A to I with h (a 0 ) = d. We argue that we also find such a homomorphism h +1 from A +1 to I. We can then proceed as in the induction start to obtain the desired homomorphism from A i to I.
R3. There are r(b, a), A(b) ∈ A such that ∃r − .A B ∈ O and A +1 is obtained from A by adding B(a). Since A is ditree-shaped, b is the predecessor of a in the tree G Ai . We must have h (b) ∈ A I and (h (b), h (a)) ∈ r I . Let A a be the ditree-shaped ABox in A rooted at a and set Ind = {a} ∪ (Ind(A a ) ∩ Ind(A C )). That is, Ind contains only those individuals in A a that were present already in the initial ABox A C , and if there is no such individual, then Ind = {a}. An individual c ∈ Ind is a fringe individual if there is some r(c, c ) ∈ A b with c / ∈ Ind. Further, let A − a be the restriction of A a to assertions that only use individuals from Ind and let C a be this ABox viewed as an EL concept.
We must have h (a) ∈ C I a . By construction of O T and since C a is of depth at most − 1 (because C is of depth bounded by ), A ∃r.C a ∃r.(C a B) ∈ O T . Consequently, there is an e ∈ (C a B) I with (h (b), e) ∈ r I . By Lemma 4, there is a homomorphism h a from A − a to I with h a (a) = e. Now consider each fringe individual c. Let A c be the ditree-shaped ABox in A a rooted at c and let C c be the EL concept that is the conjunction of all concept names A with A(c) ∈ A a . Since O S is in normal form, we can extract from the chase sequence A 0 , . . . , A a chase sequence that constructs A c starting from A Cc and uses at most k − 1 applications of R3. From the induction hypothesis and since clearly h a (c) ∈ C I c , we thus obtain a homomorphism h c from A c to I with h c (c) = h a (c). We obtain the desired homomorphism h +1 from A +1 to I by combining all these homomorphisms, that is,
J
The proof of the following lemma is now exactly identical to the proof of Lemma 6.
Lemma 12 Let C be an EL(Σ) concept of depth bounded by and D an EL concept. Then O S |= C D implies O T |= C D.
E Details for Section 6
We require the following lemma from [Lutz and Wolter, 2010] . Proof. We start with O S = {∃r − .A B}. Let O T be a projective ELH approximation of O S . For all n ≥ 0, let C n = ∃r n . , where ∃r n denotes n-fold nesting of an existential restriction, and observe that O S |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.(B C n ).
To establish the desired result, it suffices to argue that for every n ≥ 0, there is a subconcept M n of O T such that O T |= M n C n and O T |= M n C m for any m > n. First note that O T |= C n B for any n ≥ 0 because the same is true for O S . By Lemma 13, to obtain O T |= A ∃r. We aim to use M as M n . Assume to the contrary of what remains to be shown that O T |= M C m for some m > n. Then O T |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.(B C m ), which contradicts the fact that this CI is not entailed by O S .
We now consider O S = {func(r), A A}. Let O T be a projective ELH approximation of O S . For all n ≥ 0, let again C n = ∃r n . , and observe that O S |= ∃r.C n ∃r.A ∃r.(C n A). Using Lemma 13, we establish that for every n ≥ 0, there is a subconcept M n of O T such that O T |= M n (C n A) and O T |= M n C m for any m > n. First note that
• O T |= C n C n A for any n ≥ 0 and • O T |= A C n A because the same is true for O S . To obtain O T |= ∃r.C n ∃r.A ∃r.(C n A), there must exist a subconcept M of O T such that O T |= ∃r.C n ∃r.A ∃r.M and O T |= M C n A. We use M as M n . Assume to the contrary of what remains to be shown that O T |= M C m for some m > n. Then O T |= ∃r.C n ∃r.A ∃r.(C m A), which contradicts the fact that this CI is not entailed by O S .
We now consider O S = {r s − , A A}. Let O T be a projective ELH approximation of O S . For all n ≥ 0, let again C n = ∃r n . , and observe that O S |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.(C n ∃s.A). Using Lemma 13, we establish that for every n ≥ 0, there is a subconcept M n of O T such that O T |= M n C n ∃s.A and O T |= M n C m for any m > n. First note that O T |= C n ∃s.A for any n ≥ 0 because the same is true for O S . To obtain O T |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.(C n ∃s.A), there must exist a subconcept M of O T such that O T |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.M and O T |= M C n ∃s.A. We use M as M n . Assume to the contrary of what remains to be shown that O T |= M C m for some m > n. Then O T |= A ∃r.C n ∃r.(C m ∃s.A), which contradicts the fact that this CI is not entailed by O S . J Theorem 8 Let n ≥ 0 and let O n be the union of Γ n with any of the following sets: {∃r − .A B}, {func(r), A A}, {r s − , A A} For every ≥ 1, any -bounded projective ELH approximation O T of O n must be of size at least tower( , n).
Proof. We start with O S = Γ n ∪ {∃r − .A B}. The proof idea is very similar to the proof of Theorem 7. Assume a depth bound ≥ 1 is given. Take any set Ω of mutually incomparable EL(Σ n ) concepts of depth at most −1 such that Ω has size tower( , n), where concepts C 1 , C 2 are called incomparable if neither O S |= C 1 C 2 nor O S |= C 2 C 1 . It is straightforward to construct such a set Ω. Then it suffices to show that for every C ∈ Ω there exists a subconcept M C of O T such that O T |= M C C and O T |= M C C for any C ∈ Ω with C = C. Assume C ∈ Ω is given. Then Observe that O T |= M C C for any C ∈ Ω \ {C} because O S |= A ∃s.C ∃s.(B C ) for any such C . Thus, M C is as required.
The proofs for O n = Γ n ∪ {func(r), A A} and O n = Γ n ∪ {r s − , A A} combine the sketch presented for Γ n ∪ {∃r − .A B} with the proof idea from Theorem 7. Thus, one considers the same set Ω and then shows that any -bounded ELH approximation of O n entails all CIs ∃r.A ∃r.C ∃r.(A C) with C ∈ Ω and so is of size at least tower( , n), and that any -bounded ELH approximation of O n entails all CIs A ∃r.C ∃r.(C ∃s.A) with C ∈ Ω and so is of size at least tower( , n). J
